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Overview
“Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials” describes the
widespread practice of including ordinary citizens as legal decision makers in the criminal
trial. In some countries, lay persons serve as
jurors and determine the guilt and occasionally
the punishment of the accused. In others, citizens
decide cases together with professional judges in
mixed decision-making bodies. What is more,
a number of countries have introduced or
reintroduced systems employing juries or lay
judges, often as part of comprehensive reform in
emerging democracies. Becoming familiar with
the job of the juror or lay citizen in a criminal trial
is thus essential for understanding contemporary
criminal justice systems in many countries. This
entry reviews procedures for selecting jurors and
lay judges and outlines lay participation in fact
finding and in sentencing phases of the criminal
trial. It also assesses the promises and challenges
of lay participation in law. Reviewing and evaluating the effects of the different approaches that
countries have taken to incorporating lay citizens,
it reflects on whether the goals of democratic
deliberation are being met in both jury and lay
judge systems. It concludes with suggestions for
future directions for research.

Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials

Doing the Job of Democracy
The custom of employing ordinary citizens as
legal decision makers in criminal trials is widespread. Originating in early legal systems, this
practice has continued in modern times as
a vehicle for including a democratic element in
law. In approximately 50 countries, ranging from
Australia to Kazakhstan to Spain and Sri Lanka,
citizens serve as jurors, deciding cases in independent bodies separate from professional
judges. In many other countries, such as Italy,
Poland, and Japan, citizens participate as lay
judges (alternately called lay assessors), deciding
cases together with professional judges in mixed
decision-making bodies. Whether citizens serve
as jurors or lay judges often depends on whether
the legal system derives from a common or a civil
law tradition. Juries are more likely to act as
independent decision makers in common law
adversarial trials, whereas lay judges appear
more often in civil law inquisitorial trials and
tribunals (Thaman 2011).
Delegating the task of adjudicating a criminal
trial to ordinary citizens promotes democracy in
both legal and political institutions. Laypersons
bring the voice of the people to the law. They
draw on their own life experiences, allowing trial
decisions to more accurately reflect the society
that the legal system serves. This is a form of
representative democracy in legal institutions
(Malsch 2009). When the trial is finished, lay
citizens return to the community, sharing the
lessons they learned about the law, ensuring an
accountable and transparent legal system.
Employing juries and lay judges supports and
enhances democratic political institutions. Laypersons act as a check on authority. They balance
the power imbued in state officials such as prosecutors or professional judges. And by contributing to decisions that directly affect the people,
juries and lay judges engage in an act of selfgovernance, reestablishing the people’s sovereignty. This act of self-governance in the legal
realm affects political participation. As individuals perform the duties of a juror or lay judge,
they become more connected to the world around
them. The French political thinker Alexis de
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Tocqueville believed that jurors internalized the
duties they owed to society and the role they
ought to play in government. Writing in admiration of the US jury system, he observed that the
jury communicates “the spirit of the judges to the
minds of all the citizens” and that “this spirit,
with the habits which attend it, is the soundest
preparation for free institutions” (Tocqueville
1835/1945, p. 289).
Jurors and lay judges also act as conflict
resolvers. They attend to the conflict between
the state (as representative of the victim and the
community) and the defendant by reaching
a verdict in cases that may feature difficult and
often complex competing narratives. And,
depending on the jurisdiction or type of crime,
lay judges and juries may participate in punishment decisions for convicted defendants.
Despite the important role that they play in the
criminal trial, juries and lay judges face challenges on several fronts. First, critics argue that
the evidence and legal arguments now being
introduced in contemporary trials are too complex for untrained eyes. These critics question the
lay participant’s ability to understand new technologies and scientific methods such as DNA or
mtDNA and accuse juries in particular of relying
on expert credentials rather than evaluating the
substance of expert testimony. A broad trend
toward professionalization in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries deepened a mistrust of lay
participation in the law and other expert domains.
Professionals were thought to be superior to ordinary citizens because of their theoretically rich
education, instruction in the practical skills of
decision making, and greater adherence to rational scientific principles. Now, in a contemporary
twist, modern technology invites new concerns
about the soundness of lay decision making, with
some worrying about jurors’ use of cell phones or
Internet to obtain information about cases and
parties that would otherwise not be available in
the courtroom proceedings (Waters and
Hannaford-Agor, in press).
Moving from courtroom proceedings to
posttrial coverage, a second concern about lay
participation is evident in the way the public
scrutinizes criminal trial verdicts. Media and
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members of the public often disparage jury decision making following controversial judgments,
especially in cases where a notorious defendant is
found not guilty. The popular press in the United
States conveyed public outrage following verdicts of not guilty for O.J. Simpson and Casey
B. Anthony, trials that were decades apart. Similarly, support for Spain’s recently introduced
jury system dropped precipitously following
a jury’s acquittal of a defendant who was on
trial for killing two police officers (Hans 2008).
Remarkably, one of the greatest challenges to
lay participation in legal decision making is the
sharp decline in criminal trials. Despite
a constitutional right to trial by jury, in the United
States, plea bargaining and other settlements
resolve almost all criminal cases. As a result,
the number of jury trials has declined in both
state and federal courts. Today, US juries decide
just 5–10 % of all criminal cases. In the United
Kingdom, the number is even lower, at 1 % of
cases. In a surprising contrast, a number of countries outside the United States and the United
Kingdom have recently introduced new lay participation systems, often as part of broad efforts
to support emerging democratic systems (Hans
2008; Kovalev 2010; Marder 2011).
Historically, European countries transplanted
all or part of their legal systems to their colonies.
Thus, juries were found in legal systems in
the United States and in British colonies
in Africa, parts of India, Australia, New Zealand,
and some Caribbean and South American countries (Hans 2008; Vidmar 2000). Several countries dismantled the institution postindependence,
particularly where native populations saw jury
verdicts as furthering the interests of colonizers
or where the right to a jury trial was not extended
to indigenous peoples. But now, citizen participation is seeing a rebirth, particularly in countries
that are democratizing following periods of
authoritarian rule (Lempert 2007). Notable
examples include Spain, which began conducting
jury trials in the mid-1990s, as well as Russia
(Thaman 2011). In fact several post-Soviet countries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Azerbaijan, enshrined a right to trial by jury
in their constitutions (Kovalev 2010). The newly

Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials

independent country of Georgia modeled its jury
system on US juries and held its first criminal jury
trial in the fall of 2011. In the last decade, East
Asian countries enacted court reforms which created new and innovative methods of lay participation: Japan adopted a mixed court with lay
judges, whereas South Korea introduced a jury
system. Other countries, while not adopting the
independent jury model, have altered their trial
processes away from dossier-based inquisitorial
approaches toward more adversarial oral evidence presentation to facilitate eventual citizen
participation.
Becoming familiar with the job expected of
jury and lay citizens is therefore essential for
understanding contemporary criminal justice systems in many countries. This entry first describes
the independent fact finding of jury systems and
then turns to a consideration of mixed courts of
lay and professional judges. It summarizes
research evidence about how well lay decision
makers function and reflects on whether the goals
of democratic deliberation are being met. The
entry concludes by considering contemporary
challenges and future directions for research.

Juries at Trial
The trial by a jury of one’s peers dates back to
thirteenth-century England. These early juries
were composed of land-owning white men, who
testified about their personal knowledge of local
disputes. Over time the institution changed so
that jurors functioned less like witnesses and
more like fact finders. In England, distinct roles
for judge and jury developed in the 1700s.
A similar evolution took place in the United
States toward the end of the nineteenth century
(Vidmar and Hans 2007). Formally, the judge
determines the law and the jury applies that law
to the facts as it finds them. However, in practice,
the distinction between applying the law and
finding facts is not always so clear.
A sketch of the jury trial reveals a handful of
basic steps, starting with selecting individuals
from a pool of persons summoned to serve on
the jury (National Center for State Courts Jury
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Topic Page). Once the trial is underway, the jury
listens to the evidence presented and will alone
make the decision about whether there is enough
evidence to support a finding of guilt. If the
defendant is found guilty, in some jurisdictions
and some types of trials, the jury may be involved
in sentencing the defendant.
Jury Selection
A large government-funded organization is seeking 12 thoughtful people for group decisionmaking. Applicants must be willing to put their
regular lives on hold for a year or more in return
for low pay and zero benefits. Out-of-pocket
expenses will not be covered (Butler 2007 p. B1).

This imaginary job advertisement for jury duty
captures the challenges that confront judges and
other tenured members of the court in their search
for citizens to serve as jurors, particularly in
lengthy trials. Selecting members of the jury,
however, may be the most important stage of
the trial because the jury’s ability to inject
a democratic perspective into the legal system
depends on its composition. A jury drawn from
a representative cross-section of the population is
in a better position to express the full range of the
community’s views. Yet, for much of its history,
juries have reflected the more privileged and elite
segments of their communities. Men, whites, and
those with more education, higher occupational
status, and higher incomes were overrepresented
on juries compared to their numbers in the
population.
In the last several decades, jury commissioners have taken advantage of technological
advances to reform the summoning process in
order to achieve more representative groups of
prospective jurors. Commissioners combine lists
of potentially eligible residents and send out summonses for jury duty to residents living in geographically diverse areas. Some jurisdictions
even use targeted replacement mailings to ensure
representation from parts of the community that
tend to have lower return rates. Governments
have raised the compensation for jury service,
especially for long trials when jurors may be
away from their employment for a substantial
period of time. While in many countries these
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methods still fall short of producing fully representative groups, they are a decided improvement
over the past when jurors served based on personal recommendations or were handpicked by
jury commissioners.
The process of summoning a large group of
eligible jurors begins the trial. While the specifics
vary across jurisdictions, typically both the judge
and the attorneys are able to remove individuals
before finalizing the jury that will ultimately
decide the case. In the United States, the judge
has the ability to decide “for cause” challenges to
eliminate clearly biased jurors, whereas attorneys
have a limited number of “peremptory” challenges that they may exercise without providing
reasons. Other countries such as England and
Wales do not permit peremptory challenges.
The Korean system allows each side five peremptory challenges and an unlimited number of challenges for cause (Park 2010). In Canada,
subgroups of jurors determine whether other
jurors are impartial or should be removed for
cause.
Providing a mechanism for removing apparently biased individuals from the jury helps to
ensure the integrity and quality of the jury’s decision. Nevertheless, opponents criticize the jury
selection process, with some pointing to evidence
that race and other impermissible factors infect it,
and others doubting the ability of judges and
lawyers to identify and remove biased jurors. In
the United States, a robust field of jury consulting
has developed to assist lawyers in selecting
jurors; it is employed predominantly in highprofile criminal trials and with wealthy defendants (Tanovich et al. 1997; Vidmar and Hans
2007).
Juries as Fact Finders
During the trial, the jury acts as a fact finder,
working through witness testimony, exhibits and
the lawyers’ arguments in order to uncover the
facts of the case. Researchers interested in how
juries process truncated and conflicting sketches
of events use several theories to explain the jury’s
fact finding role. The most common theory is the
“story model,” in which jurors arrange the evidence into a narrative account. Other theoretical
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explanations focus on the psychological processes of anchoring and adjustment. Jurors
anchor on their initial perception but adjust their
opinion about the probability of the event having
occurred as new evidence is presented at trial.
A final theory is that jurors integrate information
by weighing relevant information and combining
discrete pieces of evidence. Ideally, jurors would
evaluate the strength and weakness of evidence
using relevant and impartial criteria. However,
research indicates that factors unrelated to the
strength of the evidence influence some juries.
In the aggregate, jurors are more likely to attribute accuracy to eyewitness identification when
a witness displays confidence, even though this is
not an indication of reliability. As well, juries
tend to give more weight to identifications made
by police officers.
At its best, jury decision making embraces
many of the features of deliberative democracy.
Members of the jury hold a diverse set of viewpoints which can be brought forward and evaluated through reason-based discussion. Open
discussion helps ensure that trial evidence is thoroughly evaluated, that rival explanations are
examined, and that mistaken recollections are
corrected. Through this process of deliberation
and discussion, the jury reaches binding conclusions on the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Empirical studies on group decision making confirm some but not all of the predictions of deliberative democracy theory. Studies show that groups
outperform individuals in recalling facts, in
correcting errors, and in pooling information.
However, studies also show that during the deliberative process, once jurors are made aware of the
majority view, they will tend to move in that
direction, regardless of whether the view is to
convict or acquit. Other studies indicate
a leniency bias, where jurors in a numerical minority arguing for acquittal have more impact than
a minority arguing for conviction. Either way, as
the majority increases, so does the pressure on the
minority to conform to the majority view.
Several studies reveal that judges and juries
agree on the verdict in a substantial majority of
cases, and that when judges and juries disagree, it
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is for reasons other than the difficulty of the
evidence. A recent study of the first 3 years
since the introduction of jury trials in South
Korea confirms these findings (Kim et al. 2013).
While in most cases judges and juries agree on
the verdict – 91.4 % of the time in South Korea –
when they do disagree, juries tend to be more
lenient than judges, perhaps because they have
a more generous interpretation of reasonable
doubt, because they sympathize with the defendant, or because they disagree with the law.
Judges’ professional training and prior experience deciding criminal cases are also factors.
The sizeable overlap between professional judges
and juries should assuage concerns about jury
incompetence. On the other hand, the research
lends some support to beliefs that juries are
more generous to criminal defendants than judges
sitting alone.
Juries instantiate civic duty and their work
strengthens legal and political institutions. Jurors
report higher regard for the institution following
their trial experiences (Diamond 1993). In
a national survey of over 8,000 former jurors in
the United States, 63 % reported that they were
more favorable about jury duty after serving.
Other studies similarly show enhanced regard
for the courts and for judges after jury service.
Surveys of jurors in South Korea’s new advisory
jury system show positive views of the experience (Park 2010).
Moreover, there may be a direct link between
jury decision making and interest in politics
(The Jury and Democracy Project website).
A multidisciplinary team conducted research on
the salutary effects of jury service on civic participation (Gastil et al. 2010). An initial study of
Thurston County, Washington, residents found
that jurors who took part in deciding the verdict
at trial voted more frequently in subsequent elections than people who were called for jury duty
but were dismissed, were alternates, or were on
hung juries that could not reach a verdict.
A follow-up study conducted nationwide
included a sample of more than 13,000 jurors.
This latter study found that jurors who had been
infrequent voters were more likely to vote after
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serving jury duty. In this case, it didn’t matter
whether the jury had reached a verdict or not.
The job of serving as a juror in a criminal trial
does, however, come with a cost. Jurors experience stress, especially following lengthy trials or
in trials where the offense and potential punishment is severe (Anand and Manweiller 2005). In
a 1998 study, jurors identified several sources of
stress, including deciding on the verdict, jury
deliberations, disruption to daily routine and
dealing with lurid evidence (National Center for
State Courts, 1998). A 2001 Canadian study
revealed similar sources of stress, including
reaching a verdict and the deliberation process.
Canadian juries present a particular challenge for
researchers, as they are prohibited by law from
disclosing any information about jury proceedings. The closed nature of jury proceedings in
Canada acts as an additional source of stress for
these jurors, who are not able to process potentially emotional or difficult information with
others (Chopra 2002). The responsibility placed
on juries is particularly acute in murder trials.
Jurors play a critical role in bringing legitimacy
to punishments that take life or deprive liberty for
life. However, murder trials can be lengthy and
the evidence presented can be disturbing. For
example, the multiple-victim murder trial of
Robert “Willie” Pickton, who was suspected in
the deaths of 26 women in British Columbia,
Canada, lasted just over 9 months (Butler 2007).
In order to address these issues, some courts
provide psychological, psychiatric, or social
work services to jurors following trial (Anand
and Manweiller 2005; Chopra 2002).
Juries at the Sentencing Phase
Even if a jury decides the verdict, it is not necessarily involved in sentencing. For most types of
crimes in most US jurisdictions, professional
judges have the sole responsibility for sentencing
criminal offenders. In six US states, jury sentencing is an option in felony trials and defendants
may choose either judge or jury sentencing. However, in capital cases, most US states give the
decision on whether or not the defendant should
be sentenced to death to the jury. In Canada,

2721

J

juries do not participate in sentencing offenders.
Murder convictions carry automatic life
sentences, and for other convictions, judges
determine the sentence bearing in mind sentencing ranges in the Criminal Code, the codified
principles of sentencing, and previous similar
cases. However, when a defendant is convicted
of first- or second-degree murder charges, the
jury can make a nonbinding recommendation of
how long the defendant should remain ineligible
for parole. In South Korea, juries decide on
a sentencing recommendation and submit it to
the judges. Similar to Canadian parole recommendations, Korean jury recommendations on
sentencing are not binding (Park 2010).
Judges and juries will experience the task of
sentencing offenders differently in the United
States. In many jurisdictions, judges consider
statutory ranges, sentencing guidelines, and typical sentences in similar cases as they determine
an individual defendant’s sentence. In contrast,
states often limit the information jurors receive
about the offense, the offender, and sentencing
guidelines. In Virginia, juries but not judges
must impose the statutory minimum sentence.
Ironically, jury sentencing may reduce the use of
juries at trial, as prosecutors use the prospect of
unfettered jury sentencing to encourage defendants to enter a plea before trial (King and Noble
2004).

Lay Judges and Mixed Courts
In countries that follow the civil law tradition,
lay judges (alternatively, lay assessors) sit in
mixed courts and tribunals with professional
legally trained judges. Lay judges serve jointly
with professional judges in many European
countries, including Germany, Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway,
Poland, and Sweden, and in post-Soviet countries including the former Czechoslovakia and in
countries of the former Yugoslavia (Hans 2008;
Kutnjak Ivkovic´ 2007). Several new systems of
lay participation use the mixed court model: for
example, Japan’s mixed court of lay citizens and
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professional judges, Saiban-in Seido, and
Argentina’s mixed court in Co´ rdoba (Corey
and Hans 2010).
Selection of Lay Judges
Similar to the way that jurors are selected, lay
judges are ordinary citizens selected from a list of
potential candidates who fulfill age, citizenship,
literacy, or education requirements. For example,
in Italy, lay judges must be Italian citizens of
“good moral conduct,” between the ages of 30
and 65 years, with at least a high school diploma
(Catellani and Milesi 2006). Citizens with specialized skills may be sought for certain cases,
such as offenses involving juvenile offenders. In
those cases, lay judges may be expected to have
parenting experience or a degree in education,
psychiatry, social work, or sociology (Kutnjak
Ivkovic´ 2007; Catellani and Milesi 2006). Some
countries explicitly prohibit selection from
among occupations with legal education or experience, such as professional judges, prosecutors,
attorneys, or police officers; whereas in South
Korea, soldiers, police officers, and firefighters
are exempted from serving as lay judges because
of the essential nature of their jobs.
Typically, a presiding judge or a commission
of the court reviews lists of randomly selected
candidates. Candidates who meet the legal
requirements are appointed or elected and will
serve for a period of time (Malsch 2009). The
process of selecting lay judges may be more or
less democratic and transparent. Citizens may
elect lay judges to serve and sit on trials intermittently throughout a period of several years
(Kutnjak Ivkovic´ 2007). On the other hand, in
some countries, important members of the community such as mayors or municipal commissioners appoint potential candidates (Kaplan
et al. 2006). To address transparency concerns,
the president of the court in Italy posts lists of
prospective lay judges in public places for members of the public to review.
In reality, the selection process can be political
and can preference certain segments of the population. In Norway, a nomination committee
picks candidates from among registered political
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party members. Some procedures or qualifications will favor middle-class citizens, leading to
a disproportionate number of middle-class lay
judges. And in countries with a large immigrant
population, citizenship requirements may create
tribunals that do not represent the population.
Lay Judges at Trial
The numbers of lay and professional judges who
sit at trial differs across the various jurisdictions
and often corresponds to the severity of the case,
with larger tribunals sitting for more serious
cases. In Japan, six lay judges and three professional judges decide guilt and sentencing in serious felony cases (Fukurai 2011), whereas in
Poland, only three panel members try less serious
criminal cases. Other countries have different
combinations of lay and professional judges
depending on whether the crime is a lesser
crime or a more serious felony offense. For example, in Germany, two lay assessors and one professional judge sit for most criminal cases,
whereas two lay and three professional judges
try the more serious crimes. In South Korea,
five to nine lay judges sit in mixed courts, with
nine lay judges participating in cases where the
defendant could receive the death sentence or life
imprisonment. And in Italy, six lay judges and
two professional judges hear cases where the
defendant could be incarcerated for at least
24 years or life or where the crime is against the
state (Catellani and Milesi 2006), whereas a law
graduate appointed as an honorary judge for
a term of 4 years can decide misdemeanor criminal cases. As in some of the panels noted above,
lay judges may outnumber professional judges.
In many mixed court systems, lay judges
decide all of the factual and legal issues in conjunction with the professional judges. This is not
the case, however, in Japan. There, only the professional judge has the authority to determine
questions of law and procedure. It is typical for
a professional judge to control the trial. For
example, a presiding professional judge may
determine the trial date and summons the defendant and witnesses. In certain courts, the presiding judge will examine the witness before other
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members are allowed to speak. Lay judges can
usually take an active role in the trial if they are so
inclined. They may examine the evidence and
question the witnesses including the defendant,
either directly or indirectly through the professional judge.
The mixed court trial will work best when lay
judges actively participate. Research indicates
that professional judges, the presiding judge in
particular, have a role to play in facilitating active
lay participation. Lay judges are more likely to
ask questions and participate in deliberations
when encouraged to do so by professional judges.
Lay judges are also more likely to be active
during the trial and deliberations when they
have special expert or technical knowledge that
relates to the issues at trial. These were the findings of observers of mixed courts in Croatia, who
noted that while expert lay judges were active at
trial, regular lay judges asked questions only
infrequently (Kutnjak Ivkovic´ 2007). This
research also found that the legal professionals,
the lawyers and judges, had more respect for the
expert lay judges.
Access to the case file or dossier affects the
extent to which lay judges are able to do the work
of assessing the evidence at trial. Germany prohibits lay judges from reviewing the case dossier
and in France, only the presiding judge has access
to the dossier (Hans and Germain 2011). Studies
of mixed courts in Poland found that even though
lay judges were allowed access to the dossier,
most did not read the file. Access to the case
dossier, laudable if one seeks equality of information between lay and professional judges, is
nonetheless controversial in that it is prepared by
the prosecution and often contains potentially
biasing information such as a defendant’s criminal record. Moving from a dossier-based trial to
oral presentations, as was done in Japan, tends to
equalize the information available to lay and professional judges.
Several jurisdictions have formal rules about
the deliberation and decision-making processes
to ensure full and fair contributions by citizen
participants. In Japan, the judgment must be
agreed upon by a majority of the panel, with at
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least one citizen and one professional in the
majority. Norwegian lay judges must consent to
the decision written by the professional judge
(Malsch 2009). Other jurisdictions may provide
for lay judges to vote on guilt or innocence before
the professional judges give their verdicts.
Research has shown, though, that even with formal requirements, lay judges often agree with
professional judges, and rarely use their larger
numbers to outvote them. A study in Sweden
found that lay judges outvoted the professional
judges in only 1–3 % of all criminal cases. In
cases where lay judges disagree with professional
judges, it is the lay judges who are likely to
modify their opinion to resolve the disagreement
(Kutnjak Ivkovic´ 2007).
Nevertheless, lay participants tend to be positive about their experiences, just as jurors usually
are. More than 85 % of Croatian lay judges had
positive opinions about their participation. And
in a study of Japanese citizen participation, 94 %
of the lay judge respondents reported having
a positive experience. Lay judges believe they
have a substantial and beneficial impact on verdicts. A study of German lay judges indicates that
most respondents felt that the court would have
decided differently “in a few cases” and only
20 % responded that the court’s decision would
have been the same without the participation of
lay judges.
Even though lay judges serve at the trial level,
in most countries, appeals are decided by panels
of professional judges only. Some exceptions
include Sweden, which uses lay judges at the
appellate level, but with a greater number of
professional judges sitting on the panel, and
France and Italy, which allow lay judges to
serve in appeal courts. Lay judges can also sit
on certain post-conviction reviews in Germany.
Sentencing Circles
Another way that laypersons participate in the
criminal trial is through sentencing circles
(Goldbach 2010). In Canada, sentencing circles
modeled on Aboriginal healing circles are being
used at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial for
adult offenders and in juvenile diversion
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programs, as a way to encourage Aboriginal participation in the criminal justice system. Sentencing circles allow for a more restorative justice
approach to sentencing, one that focuses on
moral growth, constructive resolution of differences, and empowerment of individuals and the
community to take responsibility for harm done.
The Canadian Department of Justice funds
approximately 275 community-based justice committees which provide all levels of criminal justice
support. In these communities, the justice committee works with the court to decide who will participate in sentencing circles and to identify a local
community leader to act as keeper of the circle. In
most cases, criminal justice participants, including
the judge, the Crown prosecutor, defense counsel,
the court reporter, the offender, the victim, and
their respective families, form an inner circle.
This inner circle can also include probation officers, court workers, youth workers, or police officers. Surrounding that circle is an outer circle of
friends, relatives, and interested members of the
community. Participants develop recommendations for sentencing and present those to the
judge. The procedure can be lengthy and demands
substantial commitment from victims, defendants,
and the community.
Aboriginal communities participate in sentencing circles to construct sentences for such
crimes as aggravated assault, assault causing
bodily harm, robbery with violence, criminal
harassment, breaking and entering, and arson.
Judges are less likely to allow a request for
a sentencing circle following conviction of murder or manslaughter. The use of sentencing circles is controversial, particularly in cases of
domestic or sexual assault (Dickson-Gilmore
and La Prairie 2005). However, this turn to community sentencing reflects a trend in Canada and
in other jurisdictions encouraging greater victim
and community involvement in all parts of the
criminal justice process, as well as a move away
from incarceration and retributive justice toward
more restorative sentencing approaches. For
example, in Canada, the form that the punishment
takes following a sentencing circle may involve
a conditional sentence, where the offender serves
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the sentence in the community and undertakes to
fulfill certain conditions such as doing community service or enrolling in drug or alcohol treatment programs.

Controversies
Sentencing circles, mixed courts, and juries share
similar problems and are confronted by
overlapping critiques, which are in large part
due to apprehension over lay persons participating in criminal trials. Concerns about lay competency to grasp complicated legal and factual
issues are common to both jury and mixed trial
systems. Similarly, both juries and lay judges
face obstacles in accessing the full array of information that is available to professional judges.
Lay judges in mixed courts confront the additional challenge of having to overcome professional judges’ control of the hearing and
deliberation processes. On the other hand, independent juries are under pressure to make decisions about guilt or innocence on their own, and
both jurors and sentencing circle participants
must determine punishment without the benefit
of the germane experiences or expert knowledge
that professional judges possess.
Research offers some reassurance. Studies
indicate that lay participants are able to understand complex issues and often match judges in
the accuracy of their decisions. In addition, studies show that reforms of the trial system, such as
allowing note taking, asking questions, mid-trial
deliberations, and the use of notebooks to organize the evidence, can increase the quality of lay
citizen fact finding. Other controversies, however, are less easily resolved. Even when procedures are enacted to ensure active participation,
lay judges arguably play a minor role in mixed
courts. And research confirms that juries are
influenced by pretrial publicity about a case, by
defendant characteristics such as criminal record,
and by preexisting biases about particular types
of crimes. It should be noted that professional
judges are not immune to some of the same influences. However, judges are generally required to
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produce written reasons which are thought
to protect against biased or arbitrary decisions.
Following this line of thinking, in 2009, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
overturned a jury conviction in Belgium, finding
that the jury’s failure to provide reasons violated
the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the
European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR). To meet human rights requirements,
jury verdicts must be justifiable in some fashion
(Thaman 2011). Although the Grand Chamber of
the European Court observed that the decision
was not a general indictment of jury systems,
merely an objection to the jury trial procedure
in the specific case, it remains to be seen whether
this will trigger a widespread call for juries to
produce written reasons in Europe.
Two additional controversies that have not yet
been discussed are worth reviewing. The first is the
problem of wrongful or erroneous convictions that
become apparent when exculpatory DNA or other
evidence comes to light. Juries in particular are at
risk of being portrayed as error-prone and overly
eager to convict when it comes to attributing
blame for the conviction of an innocent defendant
(Vidmar and Hans 2007). Thaman (2011) suggests
that requiring juries to give reasons for their decisions would protect against convicting innocent
defendants. Yet research shows that the most frequent cause of wrongful conviction, found in
roughly 75 % of the cases, is mistaken eyewitness
identification. A second important cause is false
confessions. Thus, in the overwhelming majority
of cases where a defendant is cleared by DNA
evidence, the contributing factors relate to the
evidence presented, not the jury’s decisionmaking ability. Research through the Innocence
Project in Toronto, Canada, illustrates systemic
pressures at the trial and investigation stage, either
because a particular case has a high profile or
because of other institutional pressures (Martin
2002). This research suggests that a pressure to
convict creates a bias in favor of building a case as
opposed to solving the crime, which in turn shapes
how police gather evidence and may even lead
officials to disregard or suppress exculpatory
evidence.
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A second troubling controversy relates to capital punishment cases. Yet here too the problems
are largely located in trial and court procedures as
opposed to the fact of lay participation. In the early
1970s, the US Supreme Court struck down all state
death penalty statutes because of evidence of arbitrariness, inconsistency, and racial bias in capital
punishment decisions. Unfortunately, at that time,
juries were given little guidance as to how to arrive
at the decision to order a death sentence. Presently,
state statutes require that juries consider or find
certain aggravating circumstances before a death
sentence can be ordered, reducing the impact of
discretionary decision making.
Jury selection in death penalty cases, however,
continues to be a problem for fair and equal
decision making. Where the prosecution intends
to seek the death penalty, only those jurors who
are willing to impose a death sentence are considered to be fair and impartial. Yet research
indicates that these individuals are more prone
to convict. So-called “death-qualified” juries are
more likely to believe the prosecution and have
a general crime-control orientation which shapes
their evaluation of the evidence. Analysis of capital case outcomes in the USA reveals that the
sentence is related to the race of the victim, with
black defendants who kill white victims more
likely to be sentenced to death than other race of
defendant-race of victim combinations. Nonetheless, the political, legal, and ethical justifications
for including citizen input in a decision to sentence a defendant to death continue to be compelling. The US Supreme Court confirmed the
importance of jury determinations in Ring
v Arizona (2002). That decision held that in
a capital jury trial, at a minimum, the jury and
not the judge must decide the elements that make
a case eligible for the death penalty, whether they
are components of the criminal offense or additional aggravating factors.

Conclusion: Future Research
In the early decades of the twenty-first century,
the role of citizen decision making in legal
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systems worldwide is at an interesting juncture.
In many countries like the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Canada, where juries have
been a prime fact finder for centuries, the jury
lives on as a potent symbol of democracy even as
the number of jury trials declines. Jurors are
largely positive about their experiences and studies indicate that participation on juries increases
civic activity. Similarly, lay judges in mixed
courts report being positive about their contributions, even though they tend to play secondary
roles compared to the professional judges. Systematic research, from surveys of judges and
juries in the United States in the 1950s to data
collected on juries in South Korea between 2008
and 2010, supports the basic soundness of lay
decision making in that it corresponds considerably to professional decision making. On the
other hand, research also reveals that sources of
bias continue to influence both lay and professional decision making in law.
More recent experiments with juries and
mixed courts of professional and lay judges present new opportunities for democratic decision
making in a host of countries. These new systems
also offer potential for greater theoretical understanding and systematic scientific study.
Research already underway in these countries
will tell us much about what difference it makes
to include laypersons in legal decision making.
Because lay participation systems are introduced
at particular points in time, researchers may be
able to pinpoint their effects more precisely than
has been possible in countries with long-standing
jury and mixed court systems.
Although there is now research on how jurors
and lay judges react to their experiences, how the
presence of lay citizens affects criminal defendants is largely unexplored. Advocates of sentencing circles propose the use of restorative
justice approaches based on the assumption that
the community’s active participation in sentencing assists in rehabilitating the criminal defendant. This reasoned connection between
democratic, accessible legal institutions and
defendants’ experiences is theoretically robust
and suggests several research questions. Are
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defendants more willing to accept the verdict or
punishment when recommendations or decisions
are made by lay members of the community
rather than by professional judges? Does the
inclusion of lay perspectives increase or otherwise affect perceptions of procedural justice?
These questions connect the conduct of trials
with justifications for criminal punishment and
therefore deserve further investigation.
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Overview
Jurors are assigned the arduous task of examining
and processing copious amounts of evidence – in
light of their legal instructions – to determine an
appropriate verdict. While jurors do a relatively
good job at sorting through the evidence and the
law, the complex nature of evidence may lie
outside jurors’ “common knowledge,” and additional education may aid jurors as they process
such information. This is especially true in the
domain of eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness testimony is extremely influential despite its potential to be unreliable. Eyewitnesses may appear
very confident in their identification of the perpetrator, yet be completely mistaken. Indeed, over
75 % of wrongful convictions overturned due to
DNA testing have been linked to faulty eyewitness identifications. Unfortunately, traditional
safeguards, such as cross-examination of eyewitnesses, result in little improvement in jurors’
ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications. This has led the
courts to establish additional safeguards against
wrongful convictions based on faulty eyewitness
identifications including the use of expert testimony and detailed instructions on how to evaluate eyewitness testimony.

Jury Decision-Making Research
Understanding how jurors make decisions has
been a topic that has interested social scientists
for the better part of a century. Legal decision
making has been studied by examining both
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